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The Expectations Gap in Humanitarian 
Operations: Field Perspectives from Jordan 
Neven Bondokji
The Syrian refugee crisis is characterized by the gap between refugees’ needs and 
donors’ expectations as humanitarian organizations struggle to meet emergency 
and development needs. The perspectives of eleven field workers from three levels 
of field management in the Zaatari and Azraq refugee camps in Jordan shed light 
on the field dynamics that contribute to this gap. I argue that the expectations 
gap in humanitarian operations is widened by the inability of humanitarian 
organizations to accurately communicate refugees’ needs to donors due to a lack 
of regular and professional needs assessments. Disparities within organizations 
regarding understanding contexts, adherence to rigid operational standards, and 
the need to address stressors on the ground also reinforce power imbalances within 
humanitarian operations and widen the expectations gap. Two effective responses 
for managing this gap are transparency with refugees and donor flexibility. 
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Introduction
The phenomenal expansion in humanitarian organizations and operations—in 
2015, there were 4,480 organizations and over 450,000 aid workers worldwide 
(Stoddard et al. 2015)—has created a number of challenges and ethical 
considerations. The humanitarian sector operates today within a complex 
environment of actors, philosophies, and approaches. Analysts usually evaluate 
the system against different typologies of humanitarian organizations and the 
various codes of conduct that regulate and professionalize the sector. Together, 
these determine our understanding of organizations’ scope of work and 
beneficiaries’ needs, and enable us to make an overall assessment of humanitarian 
operations.
Several traditions and typologies are used to classify humanitarian 
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organizations. For example, Vaux (2006), Herman and Dijkzeul (2011), and 
Stoddard (2003) argue that organizations operate on a continuum between 
the Dunantist and the Wilsonian traditions. The former is named after Henri 
Dunant who established the Red Cross, a movement marked by neutrality and 
independence from government policies. This tradition usually characterizes 
European international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). The Wilsonian 
tradition reflects the legacy of President Woodrow Wilson of the United States 
and mainly characterizes American INGOs, whose programs are influenced by 
U.S. government donations, a factor that also impacts on their advocacy role and 
capacity. Another typology classifies humanitarian organizations on a spectrum 
of classicist and solidarist organizations with important distinctions on neutrality, 
impartiality, consent, and relations with political authorities (Weiss 1999).  A 
distinction is also emerging between needs-based and rights-based approaches: a 
philosophical debate that tackles concerns over conditionality and universalism 
in relief operations (Rieff 2002; Fox 2001; Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi 2004).
Besides these typologies, two main codes of conduct reflect the shifting 
spectrum of humanitarian operations. The Red Cross Code of Conduct was 
developed in 1994 to enforce ethical guidelines in humanitarian operations (IFRC 
1994). It had little practical impact because no compliance mechanism was set in 
place to monitor organizations’ adherence to the code (Vaux 2006, 246). However, 
the code’s most important contribution was to introduce a “developmentalist” 
approach that expanded humanitarian operations to address drivers of conflicts 
and meet development goals (ibid.). Ten years later, and largely in response 
to the gross humanitarian failure during the Rwandan genocide, the SPHERE 
charter introduced standards of good practice to which organizations should 
adhere. SPHERE emphasized a shift back to meeting basic emergency needs (The 
Sphere Project 2004). Other frameworks, like the Core Humanitarian Standard 
on Quality and Accountability of 2014 and the criteria developed by the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee in 1992, set guidelines to ensure effectiveness 
and accountability but have not influenced the scope of humanitarian operations. 
The dividing line between these traditions and areas of humanitarian 
work was never rigid. Most humanitarian operations combine elements of both 
the developmentalist and minimalist approaches. As protracted crises have 
become the norm (OCHA 2016, 4), the emphasis on emergency relief has been 
maintained. But at the same time, humanitarian approaches are expanding again 
to address the growing list of drivers of vulnerability, such as natural disasters, 
armed conflicts, and development challenges. This expansion is based on the 
conviction that prioritizing basic emergency needs in humanitarian operations 
will no longer suffice to address humanitarian crises (ibid.), a conviction that 
seems to have shaped both the International Humanitarian Summit and Agenda 
2030. In refugee relief operations, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) reflected this shift by expanding its community service units 
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to coordinate developmental components of humanitarian operations and to 
focus on community building as a key area of programing.
With these transformations, humanitarian operations are increasingly 
perceived as peacebuilding endeavors (OCHA 2011; Rossier 2011) that contribute 
to conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. In refugee relief, this 
perspective can be viewed within the context of the argument that frustration of 
human needs leads to violence (Burton 1990). Therefore, providing immediate 
survival needs like food and shelter contains humanitarian disasters and prevents 
the escalation of violence in times of crisis. Likewise, community and sustainable 
development efforts satisfy higher human needs—as classified by Maslow 
(1943)—like education, identity, and respect. On both levels, satisfying human 
needs prevents the eruption of violence, hence the appreciation of humanitarian 
operations as peacebuilding efforts. 
However, in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis, the largest such crisis 
since World War II, the capacity of humanitarian organizations to achieve this 
role has been severely tested. With 4.2 million Syrian refugees in the region 
(UNHCR 2016b) and given the volatile political environment in the Middle East, 
coordinating humanitarian services offered by NGOs and host governments has 
put a strain on all stakeholders. The longer refugees reside in host countries, the 
larger their demands for education services, income-generating projects, and 
community-building efforts that require long-term developmental approaches. At 
the same time, the continuing influx of refugees means ever-increasing demands 
for immediate emergency relief. This strain is exacerbated by the financial 
shortfall. Only 58 percent of UNHCR’s US$4.3 billion 2015 appeal for Syrian 
refugees was secured, leaving a funding gap of US$1.8 billion (UNHCR 2016b). 
While this financial shortfall severely limits the capacity of humanitarian 
organizations to meet refugee needs, this study finds that the organizations 
themselves make a big contribution to the expectations gap. Their failure 
to conduct regular needs assessments in a professional way leads to 
misunderstanding of refugee needs and miscommunication of those needs 
to donors. Disparities within humanitarian organizations reinforce power 
imbalances between actors on the ground and, as a result, widen the expectations 
gap. Areas of disparity are poor understanding of contexts, rigid operational 
procedures, lack of compassion and consideration for refugee dignity, and stress 
and frustration among field workers. Two response mechanisms are found to be 
effective in managing the expectations gap: transparency with refugees and donor 
flexibility.
Methodology
This study is based on eleven semi-structured interviews with humanitarian 
field workers from nine organizations that operate in the Zaatari and Azraq 
Syrian refugee camps in the north of Jordan, and in urban areas in Amman and 
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Jordan’s northern cities. The interviewees include five field coordinators, four 
field managers, and two project managers (Table 1). They represent the highest 
level of field management in field offices. In total, ten of the interviewees are 
local Jordanians, and one is an international staff member. This gives us an 
understanding of local perceptions of cultural differences, standard operating 
procedures, and related tensions. Eight women and three men were interviewed. 
Interviews took place in Amman in December 2015 and January 2016, and each 
one lasted approximately one hour. They were conducted in English and Arabic.
This study is limited to the perspective of field humanitarian workers in 
Jordan working in Syrian refugee camps and urban areas, a large segment of 
the humanitarian workforce whose views are rarely documented. Although 
their number is limited, interviewees represent the main humanitarian actors in 
their fields. The UNHCR community service unit and inter-sector coordinators 
were approached to participate but they declined. The same applies to Save the 
Children and the Center for Victims of Torture. 
Power and Empowerment in Humanitarian Operations 
Although this article is limited to examining the field dynamics that contribute 
to the expectations gap, these are better understood in the context of broader 
Table 1. Details of Interviewed Humanitarian Workers
Area of Service Organization Location Gender Interview Date
1 Skills Training ACTED Azraq Camp F Jan. 17, 2016
2 Psychosocial CARE Urban areas F Dec. 9, 2015
3 Skills & CommunityDevelopment CARE Urban areas M Dec. 8, 2015
4 CommunityDevelopment
International Relief and 
Development (IRD) Urban areas F Dec. 6, 2015
5 Monitoring &Evaluation IRD Zaatari Camp F Jan. 16, 2016
6 Water, Sanitation &Hygiene (WASH)
Japan Emergency NGO 
(JEN) Zaatari Camp M Dec. 3, 2015
7 Youth Development Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) Zaatari Camp M Jan. 9, 2016
8 Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) Oxfam Zaatari Camp F Dec. 2, 2015
9 Education Relief International Azraq Camp F Dec. 16, 2015
10 Higher Education UN Organization and Private College Urban areas F Jan. 17, 2016
11 Women Empowerment UN Women Zaatari Camp F Jan. 9, 2016
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considerations in the humanitarian sector. The practical implications of power 
imbalances in humanitarian operations have attracted particular attention. For 
example, the imbalance between donors and humanitarian organizations is 
found to reduce effectiveness on the ground as organizations struggle to meet the 
regular accountability demands of donors (Makuwira 2006), or to diminish trust 
levels between actors given the financial power of command enjoyed by larger 
partners (Capjon 2007). The foreign policy options of donor governments also 
determine the current bilateralization trend in humanitarian funding and donor 
earmarking (Macrae et al. 2002), influence the communication and advocacy 
campaigns of humanitarian organizations (Chouliaraki 2010), and impact on 
their neutrality and service provision in conflict zones (Douzinas 2007).
The power imbalance between beneficiaries and humanitarian actors has 
also generated disturbing findings. One study describes interactions between 
workers and beneficiaries as “in-humane” even in the context of rights-based 
humanitarian approaches (Harrell-Bond 2002). Refugees’ anxieties and mistrust 
of humanitarian actors are largely influenced by the power imbalance between 
them and the field workers (Shrestha 2011). Dependency on aid is also found to 
disempower refugees (Hyndman 1996). 
On a broader scale, the role of humanitarian organizations in empowering 
local communities is disputed. Although empowerment of beneficiaries 
reduces resistance and resentment toward humanitarian actors on the ground, 
humanitarian organizations are not ready to lose control of the sector once they 
succeed in their empowering role (Barnett and Walker 2015). Another study 
argues that most organizations in Sri Lanka follow an instrumental approach 
to empowerment: consultations with beneficiaries are targeted at informing 
baseline project design but are rarely geared toward a transformative approach 
that enables long-term empowerment of local communities (Boyden, Kaiser, and 
Springett 2002). 
The power imbalance between donors and humanitarian organizations 
on the one hand, and field workers and beneficiaries on the other, is not 
disputed in this study. Its impact on the daily field dynamics that contribute to 
the expectations gap is rather confirmed. The findings also highlight another 
power imbalance, that between fieldworks and operations managers within 
humanitarian organizations. These power dynamics dictate how operations are 
run and how different stakeholders interact on the ground. These underlying 
power considerations lead to the discrepancy in perceptions that contributes to 
the expectations gap.   
The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan
Most refugees fleeing the armed conflict in Syria have sought protection in 
neighboring countries. Turkey is currently hosting 2.5 million UNHCR-registered 
refugees, Lebanon one million, and Jordan 635,324 (UNHCR 2016b). However, 
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the overall number of Syrians in Jordan is 1.4 million, and only 15 percent of 
those registered with UNHCR live in camps. The rest are scattered in urban areas, 
mainly in the northern cities (Jordan Ministry of Planning and International 
Cooperation 2014, 11). This large number of Syrian refugees in Jordan has put 
pressure on infrastructure, water and sanitation, and local governments’ health 
and education services (REACH 2016). This has in turn led to tensions between 
host communities and refugees, particularly since Jordan has received waves of 
refugees from Palestine, Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen, as well as Syria, over 
the years. 
The two largest camps for Syrian refugees in Jordan are Zaatari Camp, 
hosting 79,357 refugees, and Azraq Camp, hosting another 29,992 (UNHCR 
2016c). Zaatari Camp started operating in July 2012 (UNHCR 2015b) and has 
since then developed into what can be described as a confined town. Entry 
and exit to the camp for locals and refugees remains heavily controlled by the 
Jordanian authorities. But the quality of services has improved as the thirty-three 
organizations operating in the camp have gained experience in understanding 
and meeting the refugees’ needs. The services offered in Zaatari include basic 
relief assistance, educational and health services, informal vocational training, 
and sports and recreational activities. Nevertheless, humanitarian services still 
fall short of meeting needs in the camp, where, according to UNHCR, up to 
50 percent of the camp population is female and 20 percent of households are 
female headed (ibid.). Also, 13.3 percent of all children aged between seven and 
seventeen in Zaatari work to meet household needs, and 26 percent of them 
dropped out of school to work (UNICEF and Save the Children 2014).
The situation in Azraq Camp presents different challenges. The camp was 
established in April 2014. Around 56 percent of its residents are children, with 
a total of 30 percent of households female headed (UNHCR 2015a). The camp 
offers shelter, food, health, education, protection, and community mobilization 
services. But compared to Zaatari, the twenty-three humanitarian organizations 
operating in Azraq offer a limited range of activities and services to beneficiaries.
Although not a signatory to the 1951 International Refugee Convention, 
Jordan adheres to international norms of refugee protection and has an 
impressive track record of generosity and hospitality toward refugees from the 
region (Francis 2015). But the influx of Syrian refugees has led to tensions in 
host communities, particularly over refugees’ employment. In a country with a 
current unemployment rate of 12.5 percent and 3.1 percent GDP growth (World 
Bank 2015, 8-9), it is not surprising that 65 percent of Jordanian workers think 
refugees should be confined to refugee camps and 85 percent believe they should 
not be allowed to enter the country freely (Stave and Hillesund 2015, 113). These 
concerns have shaped the government’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis, 
in that refugee employment is heavily regulated. The government also blocks 
humanitarian projects that seek to provide professional vocational training 
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courses to refugees or income-generating grants, for fear that these will increase 
unemployment among Jordanians and encourage refugees to permanently settle 
in Jordan.
But as the Syrian refugee crisis enters its sixth year, and with no end in 
sight to the conflict, the perspectives of donors and the Jordanian government 
are shifting from emergency response operations toward a resilience strategy. 
The Jordan Resilience Plan 2015 helped coordinate the distribution of resources 
and contain the negative economic and security repercussions of the crisis 
(Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation 2014). Later, the Regional 
Refugee and Resilience Plan 2016-2017 was developed for similar purposes but 
on a regional scale (UNHCR 2016a). It is in this context that examining the 
expectations gap in Jordan from the perspective of field workers can shed light 
on the actual challenges and broader repercussions that will result from failure to 
minimize that gap or to find alternative self-help ways to empower refugees. 
Needs Assessments 
Since 1989, UNHCR has been trying to strengthen its role in community building 
and refugee empowerment. The organization’s community service units integrate 
participatory approaches into managing humanitarian operations. The methods 
and strategies they use include conducting needs assessments, establishing 
community management structures, and reinforcing refugee dignity (Bakewell 
2003, 5-8). A needs assessment is a direct empowering tool that enables refugees 
to guide humanitarian priorities. Several guiding principles, like Principle 6 of 
the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship (GHD 2013) and 
Principle 2 of the Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement and NGOs (IFRC 1994), emphasize that funding should 
be allocated based on assessed needs. Nevertheless, assessing needs regularly 
and professionally presents considerable challenges, including overcoming 
organizational bias that preselects areas for needs assessments and lack of funds 
for carrying out regular assessments (Poole 2014, 38-50). 
Methods used to assess needs on the ground vary widely depending on the 
type of services offered by organizations, the target groups, and the numbers 
of direct beneficiaries. These methods include written surveys, focus group 
discussions (FGDs), community meetings, house visits, and ad hoc meetings 
with beneficiaries. For example, when a project benefits a limited number of 
illiterate refugees, organizations opt for FGDs. In other cases, where beneficiaries 
are literate and large in number, written quantitative surveys are preferred. With 
children and youth, a mix of FGDs and daily feedback is used to assess shifting 
needs and desires in educational and recreational programing. 
Generally, needs assessments are a decentralized operation ruled by 
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project goals and individual staff motivation. Only two organizations have 
institutionalized the needs assessment tools to be used on a regular basis, while 
some organizations fail to assess needs altogether. One project has been running 
in Zaatari without needs assessments for the last three years. “Every six months 
we just change dates and send the proposal to the donor for extension,” one 
interviewee admitted. Three other humanitarian workers referred to the ad hoc 
nature of needs assessments, conducted in a rush just before a project proposal is 
submitted in response to calls for proposals announced by donors. “In many cases 
we were told to submit ideas about needs in a matter of a day or two because of an 
approaching deadline! Why we are never told about these deadlines in advance 
to conduct a proper needs assessment is a mystery to me! Worse still, in some 
cases refugee needs were decided upon in staff meetings without discussions with 
refugees,” complained a coordinator from a reputable international organization. 
The two organizations which invest in regular and systematic needs 
assessments have developed these based on years of experience. I worked in 
one of them eight years ago. Back then, needs assessments were conducted in a 
rushed and impromptu way. Today, the organization has developed a separate 
monitoring and evaluation unit that conducts regular needs assessments with 
various target groups and has streamlined a mix of methodologies, including 
FGDs, surveys, and home visits. These regular findings are fed into project 
proposals and project designs without the pressure of deadlines. The other 
organization offers educational and vocational services. Regular pre-course needs 
assessments and post-course evaluations are conducted throughout the year in 
written format and through FGDs. These are continuously incorporated into a 
needs assessment database that informs future project proposals.   
Ideally, needs assessments allow a participatory approach to project design 
with refugees. However, all interviewees, even those in organizations where needs 
assessments are institutionalized, admitted that the extent to which findings from 
needs assessments inform project design is limited. Seven interviewed workers 
(63 percent) estimated that only 15-20 percent of needs assessment findings are 
actually incorporated into project design. The highest percentage given is 60 
percent. But as one worker added, “the missing 40 percent is equally important 
because it contributes to the expectations gap and undermines our relevance 
to refugees.” These results clarify the failure of humanitarian organizations in 
carrying out a core task that is important for healthy humanitarian operations. 
Despite the efforts expended and the existence of international standards that 
emphasize the significance of needs assessments in enabling participatory project 
design, the actual impact of needs assessments remains minimal.
One glimmer of hope is emerging, however. One goal of UNHCR’s 
community service units is developing community management structures 
(UNHCR 2007, 186). A process that has recently started in Zaatari Camp 
contributes to this goal by creating avenues for open dialogue between refugees 
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and service providers and for direct assessment of needs. From a long-term 
perspective, this process provides infrastructure for the community-building 
efforts that are necessary to facilitate the eventual phasing out or reduction of 
humanitarian operations in Zaatari.
A staff member closely involved with this process explained that it was co-
initiated by UNHCR and IRD, and involves IRD community mobilizers randomly 
meeting residents in all the twelve districts of the camp to roughly gauge topics 
of concern to refugees. On this basis, two open-door community gatherings are 
organized in each district, one for males and one for females, during which one 
of these topics is discussed by refugees, staff members of relevant humanitarian 
organizations, and UNHCR representatives. Ideally, between thirty and thirty-five 
refugees attend to allow a two-way discussion between refugees on one side and 
UNHCR and the service providers on the other. “In one instance around eighty 
refugees attended. The meeting turned into a one-way communication from 
service providers to refugees because it became hard to manage the discussion.”
The six interviewees working in Zaatari agreed that these meetings have 
facilitated open communication between refugees and implementing partners. 
Meetings usually end by drawing up an action plan, in which implementing 
partners clarify what can be done to address the concerns. “This is an em- 
powering tool for refugees to manage and address their concerns. It also informs 
UNHCR and implementing partners of field needs directly and openly,” one 
coordinator of this process noted.
Nevertheless, one shortcoming of this model is that no follow-up mechanism 
was put in place to monitor progress on the action plans. This can diminish the 
relevance of the community gatherings and create mistrust between refugees 
and humanitarian actors. The coordinator explains, “Implementing partners 
should not raise refugee expectations on action plans that are beyond their 
abilities, financial or otherwise. In the few instances when this happened and 
action plans were not implemented, we noticed a decline in refugees’ attendance 
because there was a feeling that these gatherings will not result in addressing the 
issues.” As will be discussed later, transparency has proved the most important 
factor in nurturing positive relations with refugees based on respect and mutual 
responsibility. This observation confirms this and highlights that humanitarian 
organizations have responsibilities that go beyond the operational level to the 
relational one. The coordinators of this process hope to put in place a monitoring 
system for action plans sometime in 2016.
Overall, failure to assess needs accurately and regularly leads to miscom- 
munication of refugee needs to donors, who then fund projects based on pre-set 
targets. According to humanitarian workers, it is the humanitarian organizations 
that are responsible for this failure, not the donors. This shortcoming damages 
the reputation and reduces the relevance of humanitarian organizations, and adds 
to the challenges facing refugees. 
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Measuring Success
Needs assessments are the first step in developing projects; evaluations conclude 
them. Instead of asking humanitarian workers how they evaluate projects 
and activities, they were asked to compare how donors and refugees measure 
their success. All the interviewees agreed that donors measure humanitarian 
organizations’ success in terms of their ability to meet pre-set targets concerning 
numbers of beneficiaries, activities, and in-kind assistance items. Refugees, by 
contrast, consider a project successful if it meets their direct needs and if field 
staff treat them respectfully. On some occasions, refugees consider a project a 
success simply because it offers a safe space for women and children.
Donors
According to interviewees, donors measure the success of organizations through 
the final reports these organizations submit. This poses some challenges. In 
an effort to professionalize the humanitarian sector and improve efficiency, 
organizations and donors emphasize reports, checklists, and generalizable 
data. But this “comes at the expense of the less quantifiable forms of knowledge 
often possessed only by people and groups who hail from and live in the areas 
affected by disasters” (Barnett and Walker 2015, 139). This new emphasis on 
professionalization has led to prioritizing the quality of written outputs regardless 
of the actual outcome on the ground. “If a report is strongly written, even if it 
is all lies, the donor will consider the organization a successful and reliable one. 
If the report is weak [despite good results on the ground], the organization is 
judged poorly,” explained one project manager. 
Interviewees also appear dismissive of donors’ success-measuring tools 
due to lack of donor monitoring of services on the ground. This is perceived 
as a key guarantee against corruption. For example, one project that includes 
distributing personal hygiene kits to refugees is funded by the country office of 
a UN organization in Jordan. An interviewee tells how “a sample kit was sent to 
the donor that meets all donor regulations and costs 2.5JDs [US$3.50]/kit. But 
the kit that was actually delivered to refugees costs 0.8JDs [US$1.10]. The soap 
was of Dettol brand as requested by the donor, but it expires in two weeks. The 
toothpaste includes fluoride, while donor regulations clearly prohibit fluoride-
based toothpastes. If a donor representative was present on distribution day, this 
discrepancy would be immediately noticed and corrupt staff questioned. No 
donor representative was present and no one reported this!”
Corruption in the humanitarian field is the elephant in the room: everyone 
is aware of it, but no one mentions it. Four field workers (36 percent) referred to 
corruption in their organizations. In most cases, it is not raised with management 
because either senior staff members are involved, or subordinates fear losing 
their jobs. Poor donor monitoring also contributes to the perception of donors 
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as distant and uninterested actors. Nevertheless, “donors are the most powerful 
actors [in humanitarian operations]. When a refugee violates the law, s/he is 
sent back to Syria! But have you ever heard of a donor kicked out from the 
country?!” questions one field worker. Several studies argue that donors enjoy 
absolute power in humanitarian operations (Macrae et al. 2002; Harrell-Bond 
2002; Barnett and Walker 2015), not least because accountability is “skewed in 
the direction of the donors who pay for the assistance, rather than the refugees” 
(Harrell-Bond 2002, 53). For interviewees, this power comes with a responsibility 
to meet refugee needs and to regularly monitor the delivery of services.
Beneficiaries
“Refugees evaluate us by the tangible result they get, not by our good intentions,” 
explained one field manager. All interviewees shared the view that success 
is measured by whether an organization meets refugee needs regardless of 
limitations. And because refugee needs vary widely, no one yardstick can be used 
to measure success. The manager continued, “Our regulations allow us to offer 
only 130JDs [US$185] as one-time emergency cash assistance to urgent cases. 
Sometimes this amount can save someone from prison if s/he is in debt. Once 
I provide this amount, s/he will judge our organization as a success because we 
met her/his need. But when a refugee needs accommodation, we cannot offer 
more than this amount or offer it regularly. So even if I provide this emergency 
assistance once, it does not meet her/his need and this refugee will perceive us as 
a failure because we did not meet her/his need.”
Measuring success for in-kind assistance components is easier. Refugees who 
receive assistance are satisfied. Those who do not, are not. This applies to winter 
clothing services, shelters, hygiene kits, etc. At times when no tangible service is 
offered, “My team and I have to be seen doing something or other in the camp 
for refugees. It can be maintenance tasks, home visits, or utility checks. Whatever 
it is, our presence and services have to be noticeable otherwise we are forgotten,” 
reflected one project manager. 
Investing in human relations with refugees has proved to be extremely 
important where refugees’ perceptions about an organization’s success are 
concerned. All eleven humanitarian workers confirmed that even when refugee 
needs are not satisfied, if they communicate respectfully and transparently with 
refugees, refugees will consider the organization a success. Honoring refugees’ 
suffering, adhering to cultural norms, and respectful communication are 
considered key elements. This relational aspect makes up for the shortcomings in 
meeting needs and helps humanitarian workers manage the expectations gap as 
will be discussed later.
Similarly, three field coordinators argued that refugees consider their 
organizations a success because they offer safe learning and socializing 
environments. “We created a reputation as a safe space for women. Parents 
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and husbands do not have concerns about the environment here.” Another 
coordinator explains, “Our facilities are very basic. We don’t have heaters, 
electricity, or fans. Still the children choose our facilities over the better furnished 
and serviced ones of other organizations because we involve them in planning 
and allow them free space for creativity.” 
Changing Needs over Time
The overall goal of UNHCR community service units is to empower refugees 
toward self-help and community development. This goes alongside UNHCR’s 
traditional role in refugee protection and meeting emergency needs. Likewise, 
refugee needs and concerns are shifting as the Syrian refugee crisis enters its 
sixth year. As one field manager explained, “Refugee needs today are based on 
livelihood and sustainability concerns. Refugees today think long term. This is a 
positive development when their focus shifts from direct emergency needs. But 
our abilities are limited in this regard. We have seen refugees take risky steps like 
leaving the camp or going back to Syria because of their concerns about long-
term livelihood options.”
One can understand this shift in refugee concerns given the partial but 
gradual satisfaction of basic survival needs. Food, shelter, and water needs have 
been met to some extent. So the concern now shifts to higher human needs, 
as per Maslow’s argument on the hierarchy of human needs. Once basic needs 
are satisfied, humans aspire to satisfy higher needs like education, identity, and 
dignity (Maslow 1943). This should not create the impression, though, that the 
basic needs of refugees have been completely met. For instance, the distribution 
of winter clothing remains a standard annual operation for three organizations in 
Zaatari. But what this shift implies is that the expectations gap is no longer limited 
to quantifiable materials distributed to refugees, but extends to development 
needs usually measured by the quality and long-term impact of services. 
The ability of humanitarian organizations to offer services that meet long-
term needs is limited, mainly due to government restrictions in Jordan. Many 
organizations like NRC, UN Women, and IRD offer skills development courses 
with limited income-generating scope. For example, NRC has provided basic 
carpentry training in Zaatari. Those who successfully completed the training were 
later employed to fix and renovate school benches inside the camp. UN Women 
offers training in crafts and facilitates participation in charity fairs and bazaars 
to sell products. However, according to standard procedures, all services offered 
to refugees by humanitarian organizations require approval from the Ministry of 
Planning and another relevant ministry, depending on the type of service offered. 
It is not unusual for one ministry to approve a service while the other one does 
not. 
According to one project manager, funding was granted for a project that 
would offer skills development courses and follow-up grants to enable refugees to 
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start income-generating projects. The Ministry of Planning approved the project, 
but the Ministry of Labor denied the necessary approval and the project was 
stillborn. Similarly, a UN body and a private higher education college initiated 
a project that would have given local Jordanians and refugees an opportunity to 
take a one-year diploma course in one of six fields of study. Again, the Ministry 
of Planning approved the project, but the Ministry of Education withheld its 
approval, thus depriving three hundred refugees of this opportunity.  
The government restricts vocational training services to refugees in terms of 
both quality and diversity because unemployment levels and economic concerns 
are on the rise in Jordan. This prevents humanitarian organizations from 
meeting the long-term needs of refugees in education and skills development, 
contributing to the expectations gap between refugee needs and available 
services. Humanitarian organizations are limited in their scope for negotiation 
in this regard, and a shift in government regulations would be tied to economic, 
political, and security conditions in the region. Meanwhile, humanitarian 
organizations try to make do with what is available and operate within the scope 
permitted by the government.  
Disparities in Perceptions 
Disparities within humanitarian organizations reinforce power imbalances 
between senior staff and field staff and between beneficiaries and field workers. 
Poor understanding of context and organizational procedures and poor project 
design widen the expectations gap. In their efforts to manage this gap, field 
workers suffer personal conflict in relation to respecting beneficiaries’ dignity, 
adhering to codes of conduct, and managing their own stress and frustration. 
Overall, these factors are accentuated by a failure to institutionalize needs 
assessments. In organizations where needs assessments are regularly and 
professionally conducted, the impact of these disparities remains minimal. 
Contextual Factors and Indirect Needs 
Field humanitarian workers rarely interact with donors. This is a task for senior 
staff, usually based in head offices in Amman away from the field. When senior 
humanitarian staff members are distant and disconnected from field realities, 
they misrepresent needs due to their poor understanding of contextual factors 
and indirect needs. According to seven interviewees (72 percent), this distance 
between field and senior staff members within humanitarian organizations 
contributes to the expectations gap. When regular needs assessments are 
conducted, the impact of this distance is minimized. But when needs assessments 
are not systematized, as in most organizations, direct engagement of senior staff 
in field operations and increased involvement of national staff in project design is 
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imperative to help bridge the expectations gap. A few examples below clarify this 
point.
One field manager complained that “the international staff member at the 
main office who deals with donors never comes to urban field offices, or joins 
home visits and activities. How can she communicate refugee needs to donors 
if she does not see the situation firsthand? As a field manager, I understand 
refugee needs and the overall context well, but I never meet the donors.” This 
common phenomenon in humanitarian organizations raises questions about 
their ability to communicate needs, particularly in organizations that conduct 
ad hoc needs assessments, if any. Another field manager described how when 
community kitchens were no longer in use in Zaatari, some senior staff members 
from different organizations suggested in a meeting that refugees heat water in 
these kitchens for bathing/showering and then carry it to their caravans/tents. 
“Apparently, the seniors have not visited the inner areas of the camp and did not 
realize that between caravans and tents it is all basecourse; carrying boiling water 
means a stark risk of refugees tripping and burning their skin.” He then added, 
“These are the basics about Zaatari! Anyone who visited Zaatari two or three 
times and cared to walk around will be able to understand these simple things.”  
The distance of senior humanitarian workers also limits their ability to 
understand frustrations on the ground. “My managers are protected from the 
daily pressures and frustrations I deal with in Azraq Camp,” one field coordinator 
complained. “Every day I have refugees complaining, shouting, or expecting 
services that I cannot offer. My managers have only to face me once a week when 
I go to the main office and express my own frustrations. But sitting in Amman, 
they don’t understand what I am talking about and do not see the despair among 
refugee children because of lack of services or simple items needed for their 
education.” 
These problems are also related to discrepancies in understanding of local 
contexts between national and international staff. A project manager at a leading 
organization stated, “I attribute our success to the fact that most of our staff in 
both field and management levels are either nationals or Arabs, who understand 
the local context very well. They understand the needs, and are able to work 
around the hostility of host communities towards refugees. Locals also appreciate 
the security concerns of the police, and government’s concerns when it comes to 
restrictions on vocational training and income-generating projects.” This deeper 
understanding, he argued, allows managers to develop project proposals that 
respect the concerns of different stakeholders, including refugees, and at the same 
time work within the available space for humanitarian organizations. 
This perspective seems to have gained ground lately among other 
humanitarian organizations. An organization operating in Zaatari is currently 
nationalizing its management positions, according to one employee there. 
Similarly, six interviewees (54 percent) said that they had more trust in needs 
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assessments and project designs conducted and developed by locals, as these are 
based on a good understanding of the cultural, legal, and operational context. 
“We had needs assessments conducted by international experts. I respect their 
expertise. But poor understanding of the context led to misrepresentative samples 
of target groups, or having questions and indicators that do not serve the [legal] 
scope in which we work.”
The fact that managers are disconnected from contextual factors also impairs 
their understanding of indirect needs. This is best explained through the case of 
one project as detailed by its coordinator. The project was designed by a UN body 
and a private college to offer one-year diploma scholarships in graphic design, 
hospitality, media skills, urban engineering, and architecture to 400 beneficiaries: 
120 refugees from Zaatari, 280 Syrian refugees from urban areas, and 100 
vulnerable local Jordanians. Urban refugees and Jordanians were selected from 
four different cities in Jordan. For the beneficiaries, this represented a rare and 
valuable educational opportunity that had the potential to open doors to future 
employment. 
However, certain important considerations were not taken into account 
when designing this project. Refugees from Zaatari would be spending between 
eight and eleven hours away from home, during which time they would have 
to buy snacks. No budget was allocated for pocket money within the project. 
Likewise, the cost of clothing and other materials was not taken into account. 
The coordinator argued that “this will affect refugees’ confidence and dignity on 
campus.” Another field coordinator in Zaatari said that refugees were eager to 
seize this opportunity but were unable to do so because they could not afford 
the other costs involved. As for transportation, the college provided buses to 
collect refugees from Zaatari camp and the four cities and to drop them back 
again. However, this generosity was not extended to the 100 local Jordanians 
benefiting from the same project. Needless to say, this created tensions with local 
beneficiaries. Given the rising hostility in host communities toward refugees, 
this kind of preferential treatment can harm refugees and demonstrates a lack of 
sensitivity to the equally vulnerable locals. 
The shortcomings discussed above illustrate the unintended negative impact 
a valuable project can have when there is a failure to consider the overall context 
of beneficiaries’ lives. Do No Harm is a principle followed in humanitarian 
operations to ensure that services offered do not cause psychological and material 
harm to direct beneficiaries, or undermine peacebuilding and stabilizing efforts 
in the context of conflict (Wallace 2014). The project design described above 
failed to take this principle into consideration. “If a needs assessment was 
conducted in advance, these challenges [and potential negative impacts] would 
have been anticipated well in advance, and we could have developed alternative 
plans,” noted the coordinator. Today, the project is facing many obstacles despite 




Operational procedures and bureaucracy within humanitarian organizations can 
hinder the smooth implementation of plans and subject workers to avoidable 
stress. Interviewed field workers argued that procedures and bureaucracy 
cause two kinds of constraints. The first relates to cases of procedures that 
are insensitive to cultural norms, which place field workers in embarrassing 
positions. The second relates to procedures within humanitarian organizations 
that delay delivery of services. 
The Cash for Work program in Zaatari Camp provides refugees with a 
regular monthly income in exchange for tasks in administering camp services. A 
system was developed to avoid duplication and streamline the process among all 
service providers. Employing refugees in cleaning and garbage collection tasks is 
a main component of one water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) project there. A 
field manager recollected one case that placed him in an embarrassing position. “A 
sixty-year-old refugee, who suffers from a knee problem, is employed to collect 
garbage. Rules for the Cash for Work program prohibit swapping tasks among 
family members to avoid duplication. The refugee came to explain his health 
condition and requested that his son replace him so that the family continue to 
earn the money. However, the rules prevent me from allowing this, and I have no 
capacity to offer him a physically less demanding task. I found myself insisting 
that a refugee as old as my father collects the garbage himself despite his knee 
problem.” Two similar incidents were recounted by other interviewees. The 
frustrations caused by these situations play heavily on them, as they feel conflicted 
between respect for elderly refugees and the regulations in place, especially when 
they find themselves unable to offer alternatives. 
Likewise, bureaucracy within humanitarian organizations can seriously 
impact the quality of services and add to refugee frustrations. A field coordinator 
clarified this. “Our needs are simple: pencils, notebooks, markers, whiteboards, 
and stationery items. On average, it takes six weeks to get requested items as 
the purchase request runs from one department to another for approvals. Most 
often we end up getting poor quality items because they are cheaper. Rules do 
not authorize me to go personally and get what is needed to protect against 
corruption, which I understand. But [with the current system] we get poor 
quality items way too late, our activities suffer, I get stressed and embarrassed, 
and refugees become frustrated and indifferent to our services.” 
Operational procedures and centralized regulations add to the expectations 
gap simply because the delays in service provision and rigid structures influence 
the respect and trust dynamics in the field. This reinforces the vulnerability 
of refugees and increases the frustrations of field workers who appear to be 
in control of a power imbalance vis-à-vis beneficiaries, when in fact they are 
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powerless in the face of organizational procedures.  
Beneficiary Dignity versus Donor Expectations 
This study finds that in some cases project design fails to respect the dignity and/
or abilities of target groups. This causes field workers “shame,” “embarrassment,” 
and “frustration” in the words of seven interviewees (63 percent). Most 
field workers attribute this problem to failure to conduct satisfactory needs 
assessments. Without these assessments, space is left open for donors and senior 
staff to make assumptions about refugee needs. Five field workers (45 percent) 
note that the details of certain projects reveal that donors assume they are 
operating in a context of extreme poverty and illiteracy. As a result, field workers 
find themselves offering “embarrassing services that do not respect the dignity 
and knowledge base of refugees,” according to one of them.  
Two examples of “embarrassing” services are described by two field workers 
interviewed.  One field worker described how “in one story-reading activity 
for kids aged ten to fourteen years, I was shocked to realize that all that the 
activity offered was reading Red Riding Hood in less than ten minutes, and then 
offering a simple beverage. First, this is a story we tell to five-year-olds. It does 
not respect the abilities and creativity of the target age group. Second, it is a well-
known story in our culture and does not offer any new knowledge. ... I looked 
at the parents waiting in the next room and I just felt ashamed at the level of 
disrespect to their time and to their children’s abilities.” Another worker provided 
an example of informative lectures that do not respect the context of refugees: 
“The lecture topic was healthy eating habits. The lecturer had absolutely no 
clue about the purchasing power of the refugees and the poverty in which they 
live. She was talking to refugees about eating steak, red and yellow capsicum, 
and exotic vegetables that are expensive and well beyond their limited financial 
abilities!” These failures are not the responsibility of donors but of humanitarian 
organizations who coordinate the activities and select lecturers. 
Such activities destroy the trust and respect between refugees and 
humanitarian organizations. These examples cannot be generalized, but the 
negative impact they create reverberates widely in the refugee community. As 
many as ten of the interviewees (91 percent) agreed that the refugee community 
is extremely prone to negative rumors and perceptions about service providers. 
Although their organization’s reputation is important to workers, what affects 
them most is the personal humiliation they feel when activities underestimate 
refugees’ knowledge base or undermine their dignity. 
To avoid these feelings, five interviewees (45 percent) said they try to 
overcome these shortcomings by adjusting planned activities. A field coordinator 
in an urban area explained that one project’s funding included allocations for 
workshops to teach refugees about personal hygiene, like washing hands, flushing 
toilets, and taking baths. “The specified activities fail to respect the education 
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levels and hygiene standards of refugees. I felt ashamed to stand in front of them 
and teach them how to wash hands. There were highly educated men and women 
attending. I found a way out by upgrading the workshop into ‘how to read your 
water bill’. In this way, refugees received new and helpful information about water 
bills in Jordan and ways to conserve water. Only in this context did I refer to 
personal hygiene, washing hands and flushing toilets, as demanded by donors. 
I think this was my way of meeting donor expectations and also respecting the 
refugees.”
When field workers assume responsibility for adjusting implementation 
plans, it adds to their workload and stress levels. But at the same time, it enables 
them to respect refugees’ abilities and needs. They can save face and improve 
trust levels between them and the refugees. In cases where it is not possible 
to modify existing plans, daily frustrations increase. So field workers who are 
concerned about this kind of thing are faced with a choice between increasing 
their workload and suffering frustration and embarrassment. 
Codes of Conduct and Human Compassion
Besides tweaking implementation plans to reduce the expectations gap, a number 
of humanitarian workers offer personal charity to refugees in extreme need. 
Interviewees describe two ways in which they feel conflicted about this approach. 
First, they feel trapped between refugees’ urgent needs and a failing humanitarian 
system incapable of satisfying those needs. Second, they are torn between a 
code of conduct that prevents them from offering personal help to beneficiaries 
and their own compassion toward fellow human beings who are suffering. One 
humanitarian worker described how personal charity covers gaps in the system 
thus:
There was a young refugee in his twenties, who suffered from epidermolysis bullosa 
and needed to apply three packs of ointment per day to prevent complications. His 
condition was in an early stage and curable. He went to the UNHCR implementing 
partner for medical services, but his scheduled appointment to diagnose his problem 
and prescribe medication would have taken months because of case overload there. 
I helped him in the beginning by paying for his ointment because his condition 
was difficult. Three months later his parents informed me that he had died. He died 
because of a failing system. If he had received the medical attention on time, he would 
have been alive today. ... I could not have left him to suffer more just because he was 
poor. 
Similar efforts were described by other field workers. In most cases, they 
offered money for medicines or for formula milk for babies. 
Humanitarian workers are overwhelmed by the urgent needs of some 
refugees that cannot be met in a timely manner by existing humanitarian services. 
Their knowledge of the gaps within the humanitarian system is what drives 
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field workers to offer personal help when necessary. This has also convinced 
some humanitarian workers to expand the scope of their personal efforts. One 
coordinator added, “In the beginning my colleagues and I used to gather money 
and give it to the most urgent cases. Now we think of broader initiatives. A few 
months ago, my friends and I organized a campaign entitled ‘A Loaf of Bread and 
a Chicken’ on Facebook. We gathered donations from friends and family, and 
were able to provide bread and chicken to 2,317 families or 9,635 individuals. 
This was a personal effort to help.” This initiative was driven by disillusionment 
with the humanitarian system and a desire to help refugees in any way possible. 
However, individual efforts come at a cost. In their interviews, eight field 
workers (72 percent) referred to a conflict between the code of conduct and the 
compassion they feel toward vulnerable refugees. As one field manager said, “I 
feel torn between my humanity [sympathy with refugees and the desire to help] 
and the code of conduct that prevents me from offering any personal help. This is 
a very difficult feeling and a constant stressor.”  
Perceptions of the code of conduct illustrate one area of discrepancy 
between local and international staff. Local field staff consider some international 
senior staff members to be insulated from the daily pressures in the field that 
force them to breach the code of conduct. But one international worker offers a 
different view: “Most international staff are here because it is a career choice. We 
have studied development and international studies, and are convinced about 
the overall value and relevance of the several rules and standards that regulate 
our work, even if they cause stress and frustrations in daily interactions. Local 
staff members, however, are here because these are the jobs available given 
the high unemployment rate in Jordan. They come from different academic 
and professional backgrounds and do not necessarily appreciate the overall 
and overarching value of certain standards.” This view has some merit, but it 
misses the fact that local staff rarely receive adequate training that explains the 
international standards and their overall impact on humanitarian operations. 
Also, the generalization about the career choices of local staff, although possibly 
true, needs further examination to verify the argument made here. 
It is interesting to note, though, that the interviewees who frequently resort 
to providing personal charity are those who work for organizations that have not 
institutionalized needs assessments. During the interviews, it became clear that 
staff members from organizations where needs are regularly assessed are more at 
peace with the code of conduct and more capable of handling daily stress because 
they understand their roles and limitations. However, this did not prevent one of 
these employees from commenting that he feels he has “two personalities: outside 
the camp I am very different from who I am in the camp because of the code of 
conduct.”
To summarize, field workers resort to charity on a small personal scale or 
through broader initiatives because of their awareness of the gaps within the 
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available humanitarian services. They feel the urge to step up personally when 
needed. But this approach to managing the expectations gap is creating inner 
conflicts for field workers as they attempt to abide by the code of conduct. 
Organizations that invest in systematic needs assessments appear to have 
protected their staff from this conflict by identifying and responding to actual 
needs, as well as by improving staff awareness of individual roles and limitations. 
Stress and Frustration  
When asked how the gap between donor and refugee expectations affects them, 
eight interviewees (72 percent) reported high levels of stress and frustration 
caused by their inability to satisfy refugee needs. One study argues that “stress and 
burnout among social workers [in UNRWA refugee camps] result from difficult 
to meet expectations, complicated requirements and onerous duties” (Soliman 
and Gillespie 2011, 791). Likewise, interviewees in this study argue that the 
factors discussed above concerning field dynamics place them under tremendous 
psychological pressure. Most interviewees appeared to be too overwhelmed even 
to start discussing this particular question. 
As will be discussed shortly, field workers try to be transparent with refugees 
to involve them in bridging the expectations gap. However, two field workers 
(18 percent) confess that previously they would just lie to ease the stress of the 
moment when refugees asked for urgent help that they could not offer. “I would 
just tell refugees I will check if I can help and get back to them. Sometimes I got 
back saying I cannot help, at other times I just ignored the matter. ... This is a 
horrible feeling when you realize that lying is your only option. [In such cases] 
you know the system is unable to meet their urgent need, but you are concerned 
about blocking the hope a refugee has.” Through their body language and words 
in the interviews, some field workers appeared to be at a total loss as to how they 
should handle these pressures. They are unable to cope with their feelings of 
helplessness when it comes to addressing the needs they see on a daily basis in the 
field. 
External factors also add to field workers’ stress. As the link between donors 
and refugees, humanitarian workers often have to receive visitors who are either 
potential donors, political/public figures, or government representatives. Not all 
visitors are sensitive to context. “Dealing with these [insensitive] visitors is more 
frustrating than the expectations gap and dealing with refugees,” noted one field 
worker. “I live in constant frustration. From last June till last December, every day 
one donor contacts us asking to visit our centers in Zaatari. This is exhausting 
for us and for the refugees. I don’t get why donors whose mandate does not 
support ours and who refuse to fund our projects come to visit in the first place! 
As an organization, we cannot reject a donor’s request to visit. But donors need 
to be considerate. This becomes very humiliating for the refugees when we have 
different visitors daily who come to look around and take photos. Refugees often 
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ask me ‘is this a zoo? They come to see us and take photos!’” This frustration is 
doubled when visitors come for media publicity, “All that they care about is a 
photo with smiling refugee children!” 
None of the interviewees mentioned that their organization offers them 
psychological support to help them cope. I am unaware of services within 
humanitarian organizations operating in Jordan that offer regular psychological 
support to employees. UNHCR has developed some tools in this regard designed 
for humanitarian workers (UNHCR 2005). But it is unclear to what extent these 
and similar tools are available to field workers. More efforts are urgently needed. 
Interestingly, the study again finds that the three field workers who reported 
minimal negative impact of the expectations gap on their psychological well-
being work in the two organizations that have systematic needs assessments and 
standard evaluation tools. Their stress is reduced by a clear understanding of 
their role and the scope of their ability to help refugees with their various needs. 
How field workers react to stressors depends to a great extent on their individual 
personalities, but here I have made an effort to clarify how the different causes 
and impacts of the expectations gap affect field workers’ mental health. 
Overcoming Shortcomings in Humanitarian Operations
Field workers argue that there are two other factors  that help them manage the 
expectations gap: transparency with refugees and donor flexibility. If these can be 
encouraged within humanitarian organizations, refugees will be empowered to 
participate in running humanitarian operations despite the financial, legal, and 
organizational limitations. They can also empower field workers to negotiate with 
donors when needed in order to deliver better quality services.  
Transparency
All the interviewees stressed that the expectations gap damages trust between 
humanitarian organizations and refugees, and as far as the interviewees are 
concerned, that trust is an indicator of success. The personal contributions 
discussed above are made precisely in order to protect this trust. But field workers 
have gradually come to realize that transparency with refugees about funding, 
timelines, roles, and limitations also builds trust and empowers refugees. Once 
they are informed of the challenges faced by the humanitarian organizations, 
refugees are willing to play their part in managing the expectations gap and to 
use their creativity to make the best of a difficult situation. Earlier studies have 
similarly argued that ambiguity concerning contexts and roles leads to mistrust 
between refugees and humanitarian institutions (Daniel and Knudsen 1995; 
Hynes 2009).
Transparency transforms refugees from passive beneficiaries into active 
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partners. As one interviewee reflected, “Earlier we had a huge trust crisis because 
of delay in receiving funds. ... My relationship with refugees was embarrassing 
and unclear as they did not understand my limitations. Later, I started informing 
them transparently about funding details. At times when we were short of money 
or uncertain about future funding, I told them so. Only then did the dynamics 
change completely. Refugees became more creative, assumed responsibility for 
running activities, and helped manage the limited resources available.” Once 
the limitations are clarified, refugees work together to channel their efforts 
and resources into meeting their needs. Similar advances were noticed in skills 
development activities and informative workshops. In one project, refugees 
decided to cut costs by identifying qualified crafts trainers from within their 
community who volunteered to teach others. The organization had only to 
provide the space and raw materials.
From a different perspective, transparency contributes to the participatory 
approach envisaged by the UNHCR community service units through the 
dissemination of knowledge.  Knowledge is power, and power is dispersed among 
all actors (Foucault 1980). Transparency empowers refugees as stakeholders in 
humanitarian operations, in contrast to the current situation in which donors 
have absolute power on account of their financial leverage, as mentioned earlier. 
Refugees are not passive; they often demonstrate extraordinary willpower 
in their efforts to meet their needs (Harrell-Bond 2002). In an unpublished 
field needs assessment study conducted in Zaatari in early 2015, I interviewed 
255 refugees with vocational skills. All of them said they were willing to help 
themselves without relying on humanitarian services and donations. But the legal 
environment in Jordan restricts their mobility and employment opportunities, 
and the overall discourse and approach of humanitarian operations reduces 
refugees to weak recipients (Bakewell 2003, 15–16). In this context, transparency 
with refugees becomes a moral duty and an operational necessity. 
Flexibility
Eight interviewees (72 percent) asserted that donor flexibility can help bridge 
the expectations gap. Organizations that develop monitoring systems and invest 
in positive relations with donors enjoy the latter’s trust and flexibility. Trust is 
understood here as “the expectation that an actor (1) can be relied on to fulfil 
obligations, (2) will behave in a predictable manner, and (3) will act and negotiate 
fairly when the possibility for opportunism is present” (Zaheer, McEvily, and 
Perrone 1998, 143). Trust not only allows for effective coordination between 
partners (Stephenson 2005, 343), but can also increase donor flexibility in 
meeting emerging needs within a project cycle. 
For example, a project manager explained that one project offered vocational 
training to 400 women, but upon completion, it provided kits of raw materials to 
100 women only. “I was uneasy with this plan. ... I wrote back to the donor and 
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explained why this should be changed. The donor accepted my argument and 
agreed that we should provide kits for all 400 women. In this way, I minimized 
the expectations gap without stressing or damaging my relationship with the 
donor.”  This manager invests in open communication with donors, and works on 
strengthening the trust his organization enjoys with them. He is also a Jordanian 
who understands the cultural impact of certain gaps in project implementation 
and consults regularly with refugees. These four factors give him noticeable 
confidence in addressing relations with donors. 
Other organizations have built barriers between donors and staff, which 
reduce mutual trust and result in rigid implementation plans. As mentioned 
earlier, donors are perceived as distant and uninterested providers of money. 
Senior managers within humanitarian organizations instill this perception. One 
field manager complained, “My senior colleagues block new ideas, arguing that 
the donor will not accept changes. They create a very negative image of donors 
that cannot be true. Donors want to ensure that funds are utilized in the areas we 
committed to implement. If explanations are offered when we request changes, we 
can either get these approved or at least help donors understand our challenges. 
But I feel donors are the excuse used to block creativity.” This deliberate 
distancing of donors is also evident from the fact that seven field workers (63 
percent) had never met donor representatives. Likewise, most interviewees have 
no access to the final reports sent back to donors. This low level of transparency 
makes them uneasy; field staff are unaware of how their work and expenditure is 
reported to donors.  
Organizations could also make up for lack of flexibility on the part of donors 
by including an unexpected needs and/or complementary services item in the 
budget. “This particular budget item will require strict monitoring to prevent 
any corruption,” a field manager noted. “But it is important. It will allow us to 
meet necessary unanticipated needs. For example, in Azraq we did not have 
any playground or sports facilities for teenage girls. It would have been easy to 
buy simple plastic sheeting, create this space, and provide a few items to play 
with [jumping ropes, basketballs, and volleyballs]. It is not ideal, but will serve 
the purpose. Sadly, I did not have any budget heading under which I could buy 
these materials. They were simple and inexpensive needs; yet we failed to provide 
the girls with the space they wanted.” It is unlikely that any donor would refuse 
funding for simple items like these. But as mentioned earlier, field staff cannot 
communicate directly with donors, and senior staff rarely visit the field to gain 
an understanding of these frustrations. Therefore, it is advisable for organizations 
that do not enjoy open and flexible relations with donors to request budget items 
that would grant field staff this flexibility.
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Conclusion  
This article has argued that humanitarian organizations largely exacerbate the 
existing gap between refugees’ needs and donors’ expectations in two ways. 
First, accurate and professional needs assessments are rarely institutionalized. 
As a result, organizations misunderstand refugees’ needs and miscommunicate 
them to the donors who fund projects based on pre-set targets. Therefore, 
humanitarian organizations have a responsibility to invest in regular professional 
needs assessments if they are to carry out their work successfully. In this regard, 
the differences between donors’ indicators of success and those of refugees also 
affect how humanitarian organizations prioritize needs. Similarly, the necessity 
of addressing changes in refugees’ needs presents significant challenges for 
organizations. 
The second factor that contributes to the expectations gap is disparities 
within humanitarian organizations between local field workers and international 
senior staff members. These disparities reinforce the power imbalance between 
humanitarian organizations and beneficiaries, and between field workers and 
senior staff members. There are disparities in understanding of contextual 
factors, indirect needs, and operational procedures. Senior international staff 
also fail to understand the tension that exists between refugee dignity and donor 
expectations, and between the code of conduct and considerations of human 
compassion. All of this adds to the stress and frustration experienced by field 
workers. Overall, these factors accentuate the expectations gap as services fail to 
fulfill the material and relational needs of actors on the ground. 
In addition to institutionalizing needs assessments as the main means of 
bridging the expectations gap, field workers recommend two more responses that 
have proven effective in managing the gap. Transparency with refugees is found 
to empower beneficiaries and enhance their role as agents of change. This reduces 
frustrations on the ground and also empowers field workers to manage the stress 
involved in meeting emergency and development needs. Investing in relations 
with donors to enhance trust and open communications is also found to offer 
field workers the flexibility they sometimes require to address unexpected needs 
or make up for shortcomings in project design. The distant relationship imposed 
by managers between field workers and donors severely impacts on this flexibility 
and creates mistrust between managers and field staff who are not offered access 
to final reports.
This article has offered an account of the microdynamics that contribute to 
the expectations gap that afflicts humanitarian organizations working with Syrian 
refugees in Jordan. The findings have also highlighted the power imbalances 
in humanitarian field operations. These are to be viewed within the larger 
context of the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan and the overall shifting spectrum 
of humanitarian operations between emergency needs and development goals. 
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Exposing these operational and relational dynamics enhances our understanding 
of the peacebuilding impact of humanitarian operations in Jordan and elsewhere 
through UNHCR services. Factors discussed in this article deserve more 
detailed examination. Future studies may employ a larger research sample for 
each factor in order to gain a better understanding of variations. Examining the 
expectations gap from the perspective of both refugees and donors can equally 
help stakeholders empower refugees to meet their own needs.   
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